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ST. LOUIS
LAW REVIEW
Vol. XXI FEBRUARY, 1936 No. 2
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION IN A
TRANSITIONAL PERIOD*
By ISIDOR LOEB
During the last two years decisions of the Supreme Court of
the United States have declared unconstitutional a number of
acts of Congress embodying New Deal legislation. As an im-
mediate result criticisms and attacks have been directed at the
action of the Court which has not lacked an ample number of
supporters and defenders. There is every probability that the
controversy will be carried into the Presidential campaign with
the violence and animosity engendered in such contests. The
attitude of the great majority of the participants will be deter-
mined largely by their approval or condemnation of the specific
New Deal measures and they will know little if anything about
the opinions that were at the basis of the decisions and their
resulting implications.
Students of the social sciences, however, are concerned with
social institutions and processes. For an understanding of these
clear thinking, unaffected by tradition, sentiment or prejudice,
is necessary. Hence in discussing constitutional interpretation
during our recent transitional period it is not necessary, nor will
there be any attempt, to consider the merits or defects of specific
acts of legislation. It is not my purpose either to make a careful
analysis of the decisions in the New Deal cases, but rather to con-
sider some of their implications as affecting the spirit and tech-
nique of the judicial process. This will be done from the point
of view of one who, though he may have had occasion to criticize
certain instances of its exercise, sincerely recognizes the great
* An address delivered before the National Council For The Social
Studies, Department of Social Studies, National Education Association.
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value of judicial review as an integral part of our American
system.
Teachers of the social sciences have been confronted with ob-
stacles resulting from the fact that their field of work has been
dominated by the realm of fiction and imaginary human beings.
Hence they have learned the value of a realistic approach in their
studies. This method will be followed in this discussion in which
the attempt will be made to deal with facts rather than accept
the fictions in which, perhaps for useful purposes, the courts may
have found it necessary to clothe their language.
This address will be confined to judicial review of congressional
acts. While the power of the Supreme Court to declare acts of
state legislation unconstitutional is of great importance it is
affected by different aspects from the other category. It rests
upon the necessity of preventing one state from violating the
rights of another state, but, more important, it prevents infringe-
ment upon the powers or limitations established by the Constitu-
tion in the interest of the people of all the states. Congress, how-
ever, represents all of the people and constitutional limitations
upon its powers have been established for the protection of indi-
vidual rights and the preservation of the federal system. While
these are of the greatest importance they do not involve preserva-
tion of national unity which is fundamental in judicial review of
state legislation.
FUNCTION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
At the outset it is desirable to summarize briefly the essential
features of the power of judicial review. This is one of the great-
est and most important powers in our system of government.
However large the vote by which an act may have been passed
in 6ach House of Congress and then approved by the President,
it may be declared invalid by a majority of the Supreme Court.
The only way in which such a decision can be overcome is by the
process of constitutional amendment. This is always difficult
as was shown by the struggle to secure the Sixteenth Amend-
ment to overcome the decision of the Court in the Income Tax
Case1, and the more recent attempt regarding the Child Labor
1 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (1895) 157 U. S. 429.
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Cases2. In some of the New Deal issues the task of framing a
satisfactory amendment would be colossal if not an impossible
one.
Vast as is the power of judicial review it is not conferred in
express words by any provision of the Constitution. The charge
has been made that the power was usurped by the Court under
the leadership of Chief Justice John Marshall. Historical re-
search, however, has disproven this and it appears that a major-
ity of the Constitutional Convention believed that the Court could
exercise the power on the theory that it was implied from the
Constitution and precedents from the.Colonial and early State
periods.
The Supreme Court from the beginning has appreciated the
extraordinary character of this power. Recognizing, also, that the
Judiciary was in some respects the weakest of the three depart-
ments of the government, it has adopted a number of rules to
restrict itself in the exercise of the power. One is that the Court
will not declare an act unconstitutional unless this is necessary in
order to decide a case before the Court. Another is that the
judges have no right to be influenced in their decision by any
question regarding the wisdom or expediency of the measure,
as this is a matter solely for the legislature to determine. The
Court also has made clear that if there is any reasonable doubt
in the mind of the judge regarding the validity of the act he must
vote in favor of its constitutionality.
Little difficulty has been experienced in the exercise of judicial
review where the legislative act is claimed to be in conflict with
a specific provision of the Constitution, e. g. "ex post facto law"
or "bill of attainder." Certain provisions of the Constitution,
however, are general in character, such as "due process of law,"
"equal protection of the laws," etc. The Court has never found
it possible or desirable to give exact definition to phrases of this
nature. It has undertaken to give meaning to them as cases in-
volving such terms arise from time to time.
The justices, however, are human and some of them, despite
sincere purpose, have found it difficult and at times impossible
to avoid having their decisions regarding the meaning of these
2 Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918) 247 U. S. 251; Bailey v. Drexel Furni-
ture Co. (1922) 259 U. S. 20.
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vague and general terms influenced by their personal opinion of
the wisdom of the particular statute which is claimed to be in
conflict with them. It should be emphasized that this is the excep-
tion rather than the rule. In numerous cases the justices have
upheld the constitutionality of acts where it has been clear that
many if not all of them doubted or disapproved of the wisdom or
expediency of the legislation. The TVA decision on February
17th is an outstanding example, at least so far as some of the
justices who joined in the majority opinion are concerned.
Nevertheless it is clear that traditional views on social, eco-
nomic or political matters have exercised influence upon judicial
decision. While these cases may be relatively few in number the
effect of the principle recognized in one case may have far reach-
ing effect upon legislative powers in many other matters. To
give a single example, the Court in its interpretation of "due
process of law" gave to that phrase a meaning which greatly
enlarged its scope. When it was adopted in the Eighteenth Cen-
tuiy as a restriction upon the National Government and, equally,
in 1868, as a limitation upon State power, the prevailing opinion
was that it applied only to matters of governmental procedure.
Later, however, judicial interpretation extended this restriction
to legislation regulating social and economic matters. While there
is wide difference of opinion regarding the desirability of such
limitation upon legislative power, numerous cases in which this
principle has been applied make it apparent that the enlarged
scope of due process of law has enormously complicated legisla-
tive problems.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL EXPANSION
The notion that the Supreme Court through judicial interpre-
tation actually expanded provisions of the Constitution relating
to due process of law would not be accepted by those who believe
that instrument to be fixed and immutable except as changed by
formal amendment. They have to support their position expres-
sions of the Court itself, such as this one given by Justice Brewer
in a case decided in 1905,4 and quoted with approval by the dis-
senting justices in the Minnesota Moratorium Case in 1934:0
3 Ashwander et al. v. Tennessee Valley Authority et al. (1936) U. S. Law
Week, Feb. 18, 1936, p. 12.
4 South Carolina v. U. S. (1905) 199 U. S. 437, 448, 449.
5 Home Bldg. & Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell (1934) 290 U. S. 398, 450.
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"The Constitution is a written instrument. As such its
meaning does not alter. That which it meant when adopted
it means now."
Justice Brewer was careful to point out that changes in social
life may create new conditions which will come within the scope
of the powers granted by the Constitution so far as these are
applicable. But he added :6
"This in no manner abridges the fact of its changeless na-
ture and meaning. Those things which are within its grants
of power, as these grants were understood when made, are
still within them, and those things not within them, remain
still excluded."
When it is recalled that we are pursuing a realistic approach
to our problem, this language, even in an opinion of the Supreme
Court, must be characterized as largely fiction. The opposite and
correct point of view is that of Chief Justice Hughes in an ad-
dress delivered when he was Governor of New York and quoted
by Professor Thomas Reed Powell in a recent article, as follows :7
"We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is
what the judges say it is."
Two years ago, as Chief Justice, in delivering the opinion of the
Supreme Court in the Minnesota Moratorium Case8 , he said, in
answer to the above indicated position of the dissenting justices
in that case:
"If by the statement that what the Constitution meant at
the time of its adoption it means today, it is intended to say
that the great clauses of the Constitution must be confined
to the interpretation which the framers, with the conditions
and outlook of their time, would have placed upon them, the
statement carries its own refutation. It was to guard against
such a narrow conception that Chief Justice Marshall ut-
tered the memorable warning: 'We must never forget, that
it is a constitution we are expounding' . . . 'a constitution
intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be
adapted to the various crises of human affairs'. When we
are dealing with the words of the Constitution, said this
Court in Missouri v. Holland, ... 'we must realize that they
have called into life a being the development of which could
6 Ibid.
7 Thomas Reed Powell.
1 Supra note 5, 1. c. 442.
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not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its
begetters. *** The case before us must be considered in
the light of our whole experience and not merely in that of
what was said a hundred years ago.'"
The Supreme Court while John Marshall was Chief Justice
made the Constitution what it is in many of its most important
features. Since his day, from time to time, the Court has been
expanding the Constitution and, on occasion, has given some of
its provisions a different meaning from that which was obviously
originally intended. This is not said by way of criticism but
rather of commendation. It would have been enormously difficult
by any other method to change the Constitution to meet the im-
perative needs created by rapidly changing conditions.
Most important is the fact that the possession of such a vast
power by the Court imposes upon that body the corresponding
responsibility for the greatest care in its exercise and for intelli-
gent and unbiased interpretation of the new conditions and needs.
It is of course entirely proper to criticize changes in our consti-
tutional law brought about by such interpretation, but the neces-
sity for the existence of this judicial process is manifest and its
actual exercise should be frankly recognized.
SIGNIFICANCE OF TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AFTER WORLD WAR
This is particularly true in a transitional period such as that
with which we have been confronted since the World War. Dur-
ing the War there had been a great expansion of national power.
The natural reaction at the close of the war to governmental
interference and to the increase in national regulations was only
temporary in character. Cataclysmic changes in business, indus-
try, agriculture and labor soon led to new problems that were in-
capable of solution by local and state authorities. With the de-
pression and its tremendous social and economic incidents the
cycle was complete and there were irresistible demands for na-
tional legislation and administration to remedy the situation.
Wide differences of opinion have naturally prevailed regard-
ing the New Deal legislation and the methods adopted in carry-
ing this into execution. As previously indicated these do not
come within the scope of this discussion. It is of importance for
our purpose, however, to note the widespread conviction that na-
tional power should be exerted to deal with the situation regard-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol21/iss2/1
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less of traditional conceptions concerning the limitations upon
such power. Nor was this the first example of such demand.
Similar, though not as great pressure, had been manifested on
many occasions and Congress had responded with legislation
regulating lotteries, health, pure foods and drugs, intrastate
commerce in intoxicating liquors and narcotics, theft of auto-
mobiles, etc. Moreover, the Supreme Court was able to find prin-
ciples of constitutional law to sustain most of such legislation,
notwithstanding the fact that Congress had been granted no
power of regulation in these fields and that such matters were
clearly within the reserved powers of the states.
In 1933, moreover, the demand was for immediate action which
meant that Congress had not the time even if it had been able
to carry on investigations by experts regarding the methods and
machinery to be utilized in carrying its policies into effect. Hence,
it resorted to vast delegation of power to the President and other
executive officials to provide these details relying upon the fact
that the Supreme Court had never held any such previous dele-
gations unconstitutional as a violation of the principle of the
separation of powers.
THE NEW DEAL DECISIONS
While this discussion is concerned with the cases in which the
Court held New Deal acts unconstitutional, it must be noted that
it has sustained such legislation in other cases. As previously
stated there have been adequate grounds for believing that in the
latter some of the justices who concurred in the opinions did not
agree with the policies embodied in the acts. In accordance with
the proper rule of construction, however, they recognized that
the determination of such matters was within the field of legis-
lative and not of judicial competence. In cases in which New
Deal legislation has been declared invalid the Court, or the major-
ity opinion, has been careful to emphasize that the same prin-
ciple has been adhered to. It remains to consider whether the
opinion supports this contention.
It is not necessary to discuss all of the cases. Of the five that
are of major importance,9 three0 were decided by a Court that
'Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan (1934) 293 U. S. 388; Schechter Poultry
Co. v. U. S. (1935) 295 U. S. 495; Railroad Retirement Board et al. v.
Alton Railroad Co. et al. (1935) 295 U. S. 330; Louisville Joint Stock Land
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was unanimous or nearly so. Of these, no question arises in the
case involving the Frazier-Lemke Act,"' and brief attention only
will be given to the other two cases in this class. In the first of
these, the Planama Oil Case 2, which held that there had been an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the immediate
difficulty was overcome by a new Act of Congress. Justice Car-
dozo in his dissenting opinion felt that it was possible for the
Court to discover the intent of Congress from the declaratory
preamble and other sections of the Act and he makes it clear that
the majority opinion advanced an entirely new test of validity
in requiring a statement of findings by the President.
In the Schechter NRA Case"1 the Court was unanimous. It
found that the code involved in this case represented an uncon-
stitutional delegation of legislative power. This was sufficient to
decide the case before the Court and in accordance with the rule
of construction it was not necessary nor perhaps proper for the
Court to consider any other aspect. Neverthless the opinion pro-
ceeded to find that the Act also constituted a violation of the
reserved power of the state to regulate its own internal affairs.
In arriving at this conclusion the Court applied, in a different
way than had been customary, a distinction between intrastate
transactions that "directly" affect interstate commerce and those
that have only an "indirect" effect. These vague terms are not
expressed in the Constitution but were invented by the Court and
must be interpreted by it. Today most commerce has become of
some national concern. Whether that which is intrastate has
sufficient "direct" effect upon interstate commerce to authorize
congressional regulation, will have to be determined by the jus-
tices who must struggle to prevent their personal opinions from
influencing their decision upon matters for which there may be
no other objective test.
The two remaining cases were decided by a divided Court. In
the first, the Railway Pension Case4, the majority found certain
Bank v. Radford (1935) 295 U. S. 555; U. S. v. Butler (1935) 56 Sup.
Ct. 312.10 Louisville Joint Stock Lank Bank v. Radford, supra, note 9; Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, supra, note 9; Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U. S., supra,
note 9.
2%. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, supra, note 9.
= Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, supra, note 9.
13 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U. S., supra, note 9.
14 Railroad Retirement Board et al. v. Alton Railroad et al., supra, note 9.
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provisions of the Act in conflict with due process of law and as
the Court held these parts to be inseparable from other sections
the entire Act was unconstitutional. This was sufficient for the
decision of the case before the Court, but the opinion proceeded
to declare that the Act was also unconstitutional for the reason
that a compulsory pension law for interstate railroads was not a
regulation of interstate commerce and hence could not be validly
enacted by Congress.
The Chief Justice, speaking for himself and three other dis-
senting justices, held that certain sections of the Act violated
due process, but that they were severable, so that the remaining
sections could stand. His chief criticism, however, was directed
at the holding that a compulsory pension law was not a regula-
tion of interstate commerce so far as interstate railroads are con-
cerned. He marshals an imposing list of prior opinions upholding
congressional acts which regulate interstate railroads regarding
safety, employer's liability and other relations with their em-
ployees. He states that the power of Congress to pass a work-
man's compensation act to govern interstate carriers does not
seem to be questioned and he insists that "compensation and pen-
sion measures f'or employees rest upon similar basic considera-
tions."15 While he naturally refrains from a direct statement, it
may be implied from his language that considerations of the wis-
dom or expediency of the act must have affected the majority
opinion. Thus, he says :16
"At best, the question as to the extent of superannuation,
and its effect, is a debatable one, and hence one upon which
Congress was entitled to form a legislative judgment."
And in his concluding paragraph, he says :17
"The power committed to Congress to govern interstate
commerce does not require that its government should be
wise, much less that it should be perfect."
While the decision holds that Congress can not pass a com-
pulsory pension law for employees engaged in interstate com-
merce, it may be argued that it is legal for the state to enact
such legislation. While this is true theoretically, from a practical
15 Ibid. 1. c. 383.
16 Ibid. 1. c. 379.27 Ibid. 1. c. 391.
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point of view it offers no solution to. the problem. Today, our
railroad system is national in character and in all important mat-
ters demands and receives uniformity in regulation. Such uni-
formity can not be secured through separate state pension laws
any more than in rate schedules or employer's liability. The law
as announced by the Court does not correspond with the realities
of modern commerce or railroad transportation.
The last case to be considered involved the AAA and is the
latest in which a New Deal act has been declared invalid. 8 Here
the division in the Court is 6 to 3, the Chief Justice now being
with the majority in the Pension Case. This case does not turn
on matters of due process or interstate commerce as the Court
held that the great and controlling question was the power of
Congress to levy taxes and appropriate the income thereof to
promote the general welfare. Congress declared the existence of
an economic emergency which affected agricultural commodities
with a public interest, levied taxes on the processors of certain
commodities, and appropriated the proceeds thereof for rental
or benefit payments to producers for reduction in acreage or pro-
duction for market of certain agricultural commodities.
The powers of Congress to levy such taxes and to appropriate
money for a large variety of purposes had been so consistently
upheld that it had been anticipated that any attack based on the
claim that the purpose of this Act was not within the "general
welfare" clause would fail. This phrase is one of those vague
and general provisions in the Constitution to which reference has
been made previously. The majority, however, practically side-
stepped this issue. Justice Roberts, who delivered the opinion,
said that it was not necessary to determine whether an appro-
priation in aid of agriculture falls within general welfare as an-
other principle of the Constitution prohibits the enforcement of
the AAA. Thus he reversed the position taken in the Pension
Case when after holding the Act invalid because of violation of
"due process" he nevertheless proceeded to consider and con-
demn it as not within the power to regulate interstate commerce.
This seeming inconsistency has been seized upon by opponents of
judicial review who assert that in the Pension Case the majority
I8 U. S. v. Butler, supra, note 9.
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sought to make it impossible for Congress to pass a new pension
law free from any defects regarding due process, while in the
AAA case they wished to avoid a decision that aid for farmers
was not within "general welfare."
What then is this principle of the Constitution that the major-
ity found prohibitory of the AAA? It is that of the reserved
rights of the states which was invaded by national regulation of
agricultural production. The Court held that as farmers were
required to enter into contracts with federal agents for a reduc-
tion in production in order to secure the benefit payments, the
plan at best "is a scheme for purchasing with federal funds sub-
mission to federal regulation of a subject reserved to the states."
This interpretation is another example of the failure to recog-
nize the realities of our modern life. It is intelligible so far as
four of the justices who joined in this opinion are concerned as
they dissented in the Minnesota Moratorium Case on the theory
that what the Constitution "meant when adopted it means now."
But the Chief Justice who wrote the opinion in that case ex-
pressly repudiated this doctrine and Justice Roberts who wrote
the opinion in this AAA ease concurred in the Chief Justice's
opinion in the Moatorium Case. The Court in effect says that
Congress may not tax for the purpose of appropriating money
for the regulation of agricultural production as the latter is a
power that may be exercised only by the states. This position is
taken notwithstanding the fact that no state has ever undertaken
any serious exercise of such power, and, what is far more im-
portant, under modern conditions, could not possibly make any
such regulation effective. Imagine Missouri entering upon a plan
to promote the interests of its growers of corn by a system of
crop reduction or benefit payments while Illinois, Iowa, Kansas
and other neighboring states did nothing or something different
from the Missouri plan. The statement that only the states can
control agricultural production means then, in effect, that no
governmental control can be exercised over this matter-Perhaps
this is wisest, but the Court is careful to reiterate in its opinion
in this case that: "This Court neither approves nor condemns any
legislative policy."'19
19 Ibid. 1. c. 318.
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The implications of this interpretation are far more serious
than its immediate effect upon farmers. Indeed, as regards the
latter, pending legislation in Congress, supported by large major-
ities made up of Pro and Anti New Dealers, gives promise of
nullifying any evil results. But the great powers of levying taxes
and appropriating money have been subjected to new and signifi-
cant limitations. The three dissenting justices, speaking through
Justice Stone, make this abundantly clear. After quoting the
classic statement of Chief Justice Marshall regarding the proper
principle of constitutional interpretation he says :20
"This cardinal guide to constitutional exposition must now
be rephrased so far as the spending power of the federal
government is concerned."
And referring to the new test of validity in the majority opinion
he says :21
"Such a limitation is contradictory and destructive of the
power to appropriate for the public welfare, and is incapable
of practical application... The government may give seeds
to farmers, but may not condition the gift upon their being
planted in places where they are most needed or even planted
at all."
The dissenting opinion, moreover, leaves little ground for doubt
that the three justices believed that the decision was influenced
by considerations of the wisdom of the legislative policy embodied
in the AAA. After referring to the great extent of the govern-
mental power of the purse Justice Stone says :22
"The suggestion that it must now be curtailed by judicial
fiat because it may be abused by unwise use hardly rises to
the dignity of argument."
And,28
"A tortured construction of the Constitution is not to bejustified by recourse to extreme examples of reckless con-
gressional spending... Such suppositions are addressed to
the mind accustomed to believe that it is the business of
courts to sit in judgment on the wisdom of legislative action.
Courts are not the only agency of government that must be
assumed to have the capacity to govern. Congress and the
20 Ibid. 1. c. 327.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid. 1. c. 328.
23 Ibid.
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courts both unhappily may falter or be mistaken in the per-
formance of their constitutional duty."
When language as strong as this is used by members of the
Court, it is not surprising to find that those who are disappointed
with the immediate effect of decisions of the Court in constitu-
tional cases, have launched attacks upon its power of judicial re-
view. Moreover, as previously indicated, an answer that a con-
stitutional amendment can always overcome a wrong decision is
not entirely satisfactory.
The difficulties in the way of such a remedy are great and at
times so enormous as to make it useless. Former Governor Caul-
field in an address delivered on Tuesday of this week in referring
to a proposal for an amendment giving Congress power over so-
cial, economic or working conditions said :24
"The mere framing of such an amendment is appalling to
any one with the slightest regard for our present form of
government."
While he was probably chiefly concerned with the invasion of the
rights of the states his language could be properly applied to the
difficulty of framing an amendment that would accomplish what
was desired without involving other things that were not in the
mind of the framers.
In conclusion it must be remembered that under the Constitu-
tion as it now exists the Supreme Court is not immune from con-
trol by other departments of government. There has developed
an increasing understanding of the realities of the power of
judicial review. This has been shown in the changed attitude of
the Senate in passing upon presidential nominations for the posi-
tion of Justice of the Supreme Court. The scrutiny to which the
nominees have been subjected has not been confined to their char-
acter and judicial attainments but to their previous professional
employment and even their judicial decisions that involved social
and economic matters.
Congress has power to restrict the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court and to increase the number of its members, so
that, with the cooperation of the President, the Court could be
packed. The former power was used by the Republican majority
24 See St. Louis Globe Democrat, Feb. 19, 1936.
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in Congress to pass a law over the veto of President Johnson in
order to take away the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in a case involving the constitutionality of the Reconstruc-
tion Acts. The second power was used in Grant's administration
to increase the number of justices after that number had been
reduced in the previous administration to prevent President John-
son from making any appointment. President Grant nominated
two new justices on the same day the Supreme Court by a divided
vote held the Legal Tender Act unconstitutional. Soon after-
wards the Court ordered a rehearing of the case and the two
new justices with the three who had dissented made a majority
in favor of the validity of the Legal Tender Act. While there is
no evidence that this was an effort to pack the Court it shows
the dangerous possibility of such a situation.
Attacks upon the Supreme Court and its power of judicial re-
view are not new in our history and have come from different
political parties. Various proposals have been made to modify
or abrogate all or a part of its power to declare legislative acts
unconstitutional. The institution of judicial review is not perfect
and its exercise at times has been faulty. Nevertheless it is an
historical product of American constitutional development. As
it is also probably the best plan that could be devised for dealing
with the problems arising out of our system of federal govern-
ment and limited powers it should be preserved. This desirable
result can be secured, however, only if the members of the Court
will rigorously follow the rules of constitutional construction that
the Court has laid down and will make their interpretation of the
Constitution conform to the realities of our modern world.
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